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Introduction 
Understanding movements in broad money is important for
the conduct of monetary policy.  Broad money is the sum of
the sterling notes and coin and the sterling bank and building
society deposits held by the UK non-bank private sector.(2) The
behaviour of broad money is likely to contain corroborative
information about the current level of nominal spending in the
economy.  It may also provide incremental information about
future movements in nominal spending and hence is a useful
indicator of future inflationary pressure, alongside a range of
other indicators.(3) Additionally, the behaviour of broad money
may help to reveal the nature of the monetary transmission
mechanism, especially when monetary policy is operated
through central bank asset purchases, intermediated via the
banking system.
Since the onset of the financial crisis in the second half of
2007, money growth has slowed dramatically.  By the start of
the recession in 2008 Q2, annual broad money growth had
dipped below the average rate observed over the previous
decade, and by the end of 2009 it had fallen below 1%,
although it has recovered a little since.  This weakness in
money growth is striking, even when viewed in a long-run
historical context (Chart 1).(4) Growth rates of less than 1%
have not been observed since the early 1960s.
The continued weakness in broad money growth might look
puzzling when compared to the recent behaviour of nominal
spending in the economy.  The growth rate of nominal
spending (nominal GDP) has picked up sharply over the past
year, despite subdued money growth (Chart 2).  This means
that money has had to circulate at a greater rate in the
economy to finance the higher value of transactions — in
other words there has been an increase in the velocity of
circulation of broad money.(5) That is in contrast to
the long-run downward trend observed in velocity since the
1980s.
The incremental information in broad money growth about
future nominal spending has to be conditioned on a view of
the outlook for the velocity of circulation.  Currently broad
money growth is weak, which might signal a downside risk to
future nominal spending and, ultimately, inflation.  But there
may be reasons why both the supply of, and demand for,
broad money may have changed relative to spending.  That
would lead to a change in the equilibrium level of the velocity
of circulation.  So understanding the recent factors influencing
velocity and the extent to which they might persist will be
important for assessing future inflationary pressures.
The aim of this article is to explain the recent weakness in
broad money growth and the path of broad money velocity,
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and draw out the implications for future nominal spending and
inflation.  The article is organised into four sections.  The first
section draws on earlier Quarterly Bulletin articles and outlines
an established framework for thinking about the determinants
of broad money and the relationship between money and
nominal spending.  The second section then applies this
framework to the recent data, by looking at the key factors
contributing to the weakness in broad money since the start of
the recession.  The third section examines the relationship
between money and nominal spending over this period and
considers what this may imply about the future path for the
velocity of circulation.  And the fourth section considers the
incremental information that we can glean from the money
data about the impact of the programme of asset purchases
conducted by the Bank of England on behalf of the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC).
The determinants of broad money and the link
with nominal spending
In order to understand movements in broad money, it is useful
to distinguish between factors affecting the supply of money
and factors affecting the demand for money.  It is also
important to consider the mechanisms through which money
supply and demand are made equal.(1)
The supply and demand for money
The supply of broad money is determined by transactions
between the banking sector (including the central bank) and
the non-bank private sector.  The most important of these
transactions historically has been the provision of credit by the
banking sector to the non-bank private sector.  When a bank or
building society makes a loan to households or companies it
automatically creates a deposit — either for the borrower, or
for the recipient of the borrowers’ expenditure if the loan is
spent immediately (as in the case of purchasing a house,
spending on a credit card or drawing on an overdraft facility).
More generally, any transaction between the banking sector
and the non-bank private sector will involve the creation or
destruction of banking sector deposits and will thus affect the
supply of broad money.  For example, paying out dividends will
create money when a bank credits shareholders’ accounts with
a deposit.  Conversely, if banks retain profits that would
otherwise have been paid to shareholders as dividends, this
will reduce the supply of money.  Issuance of long-term debt
or equity by banks will also destroy money as asset managers
purchase the instruments using their deposits.
The demand for broad money can be understood in terms of












1870 90 10 30 50 70 90 10
Percentage change on a year earlier 
+
–
80 1900 20 40 60 80 2000
Chart 1 Broad money growth in a long-run context(a)(b)
Sources:  Bank of England, Capie and Webber (1985) and Hills et al (2010).
(a) Peacetime recession periods are shown in grey. Prior to 1924 annual recessions are shown.  After 1924 periods of two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth are shown.
















Nominal GDP (right-hand scale)
Broad money (right-hand scale)
Broad money velocity (left-hand scale)
Ratio Percentage changes on a year earlier
+
–
Chart 2 Velocity, broad money and nominal GDP(a)(b)(c)
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as in Chart 1.
(b) Nominal GDP is measured at market prices.
(c) Broad money velocity is defined as quarterly nominal GDP divided by the outstanding stock
of broad money.
(1) See Congdon (1992, 2005) and Berry et al (2007) for a more detailed discussion.24 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
carrying out and settling transactions — its ‘medium of
exchange’ role;  second, it is also held as a financial asset in
household and company portfolios — its ‘store of value’ role.
So the demand for money is likely to depend on:
(a) the value of transactions in the economy — nominal
spending on goods and services and the value of asset
transactions;
(b) the overall value of asset portfolios or ‘wealth’ — households
and companies would be expected, other things equal, to
hold a certain share of their portfolio in money;
(c) the relative rate of return on money — the yield on money
(deposit rates) compared to other assets will determine the
share of the portfolio that households and companies
choose to hold in money;  and
(d) the degree of uncertainty — households and companies
may choose to hold higher money balances if either the
economic outlook or their ability to access credit is
unusually uncertain.
The adjustment of money demand and supply to
shocks
It is useful to consider the mechanism through which money
supply and demand are made consistent.  If a set of
transactions between the banking sector and non-bank private
sector leads to a net increase in the supply of money, then one
of the determinants of the demand for money — nominal
spending, wealth or relative rates of return — must also move
in order for households and companies to be willing to hold
more money.  Similarly, if there is a rise in the demand for
money by households or companies then something must
change to induce the banking sector to increase the money
supply by lending more to those households and companies;
or alternatively one of the other determinants of money
demand must change to offset the original increase in demand.
The adjustment in the determinants of the demand for money
may not happen immediately.  According to standard
economic theory, the demand for money by households and
companies is a target level of money balances that they wish
to hold on average over a given period.  But they will often
accept holding more or less than that amount in the short
term as a (possibly very temporary) means of bridging the gap
between payments and receipts.  This is generally known as
the buffer-stock theory of money demand.(1) The theory
suggests that, in the short run, the aggregate stock of money
is largely determined by supply factors and is only made
consistent with the underlying demand for money over a
longer horizon.
The link between money and nominal spending
The key issue for monetary policy is the extent to which shifts
in money supply and demand lead to subsequent changes in
nominal spending (and ultimately inflation).  On the one hand,
a shift in either money supply or money demand may require a
change in nominal spending to restore equilibrium.  On the
other hand, equal shifts in money supply and money demand
may lead to no change in nominal spending, but instead result
in a change in the velocity of circulation.  The outcome will
depend on the shocks that hit the economy and the time that
they take to propagate.
For example, an increase in competitiveness within the
banking sector (such as occurred in the 1980s and early to
mid-2000s) is likely to lead to a permanent fall in the velocity
of circulation.  Greater banking sector competitiveness would
act to lower the interest rate on bank loans and increase
deposit rates.  The resulting fall in the overall cost of financial
intermediation for households and companies is likely to
induce a substitution towards bank credit from alternative
forms of finance, increasing the money supply for a given level
of nominal spending.  At the same time, the rise in deposit
rates relative to the return on other assets will increase the
portfolio demand for money.  An increase in both the supply of
and demand for money at a given level of transactions implies
an increase in broad money relative to nominal spending and
so a fall in the equilibrium velocity of circulation.(2)
In contrast, a programme of central bank asset purchases from
the non-bank private sector is more likely to lead only to an
adjustment in nominal spending in the medium term.  In the
first instance, a fall in the yields of non-monetary assets and a
rise in their prices is likely to be required to persuade
households and companies to hold a higher stock of money.
The increase in money balances will initially lead to a fall in
velocity.  But the accompanying increase in asset prices will
boost financial wealth and so is likely to contribute to an
increase in nominal spending over time as wealth effects take
hold.  Much of the initial fall in the velocity of circulation is
therefore likely to be temporary.(3)
In the next two sections, this money supply and demand
framework is used to look at the determinants of broad money
and its relationship with nominal spending over the recent
recession.  First, the determinants of broad money are
examined from a supply perspective, using both an
accounting and economic analysis.  The next section then
analyses the extent to which these movements in money
supply have been associated with movements in nominal
spending or movements in the velocity of circulation.
(1) See Laidler (1984) and Milbourne (1988) for a discussion of buffer-stock models.
(2) Nominal spending might also be affected by this shock.  The move towards a more
competitive banking system and greater financial intermediation might boost
potential supply in the economy if it made possible investment projects that were not
viable at a higher level of spreads.  But how that would affect the price level and
nominal spending would depend on the monetary policy response.
(3) For a discussion of the possible monetary transmission mechanism of central bank
asset purchases, see Benford et al (2009).Research and analysis The recent weakness in broad money growth 25
Factors affecting the supply of broad money
Counterparts analysis
Tracing through changes in the composition of the banking
sector’s aggregate balance sheet can provide a useful insight
into the factors affecting the supply of broad money.  A change
in the stock of broad money is a change to one component of
the liabilities of the banking sector, and must have a
counterpart elsewhere on the balance sheet:  either a
complementary change in the assets of the banking sector,
such as loans advanced, or an offsetting change in the other
liabilities of the banking sector, such as banks’ long-term debt
or equity.  This counterparts framework is discussed in more
detail in the box on page 26.
In the past, money and credit flows have been tightly
correlated — because the extension of loans mechanically
creates deposits, credit has been a key counterpart to money
(Chart 3).  But that relationship is not exact and at certain
times credit growth has exceeded money growth.  During
these periods some of the lending to households and
companies is likely to have been funded by issuance of
non-deposit liabilities (for example long-term bonds or
securitisations) or deposits from non-residents.  Changes in
other counterparts to money can shed light on these issues.
To analyse the recent weakness in broad money growth it
is useful to compare the movements in money and its
counterparts during the recent recession to those seen
over the previous decade and in the early 1990s recession
(Chart 4).  During both these earlier periods, credit creation
was the dominant counterpart to money growth.  In contrast,
there have been three principal counterparts to the recent
weakness in broad money growth since the onset of the recent
recession in mid-2008.  First, sterling lending to the non-bank
private sector (M4L) has been very weak, even relative to the
1990s recession, and, unusually, credit growth has not been
the main positive driver of money growth.  Second, sterling
non-deposit liabilities of the banking sector (such as equity
and long-term debt) have grown markedly.  This caused a
sharp fall in net other sterling assets and was an unusually
large drain on money growth.  Third, net sterling lending to the
public sector has been markedly strong, providing a highly
unusual boost to money growth.
Economic factors
The three principal accounting counterparts to the recent
weakness in broad money growth can be linked to three key
economic developments.  First, the financial crisis has been
associated with a contraction in the supply of credit.  Second,
the need to stabilise the banking sector following the financial
crisis led to significant balance sheet repair.  Third, the severity
of the recession led to a programme of asset purchases
undertaken by the Bank of England on behalf of the MPC.  Each
economic development is addressed in turn and its impact on
broad money estimated.  These estimates are then compared
with the principal accounting counterparts to the recent
weakness in broad money growth.
I  The financial crisis and weak bank lending
The financial crisis and subsequent recession were associated
with a marked reduction in the flow of new lending to
households and companies.  As extending new loans creates
deposits, weak lending was a key counterpart to weak money
growth.
A substantial fall in the flow of new credit is not unusual during
a recession and the early stages of recovery.  But the lending
slowdown in the recent recession has been particularly sharp
and aggregate credit flows have reached an unusually low level














Chart 3 Money and credit flows(a)(b)
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as in Chart 1.
(b) Both money (M4) and lending (M4L) flows exclude transactions with intermediate other
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Chart 4 Counterparts to broad money growth(a)(b)(c)(d)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) M4 and M4L are defined as in Chart 3.
(b) Units give the average quarterly inflow into a given counterpart over the period specified,
expressed as a percentage of average quarterly nominal GDP over that same period. 
(c) ‘Net sterling other assets’ adjusted to include changes in sterling liabilities stemming from
loan securitisations.
(d) ‘Other counterparts’ is given by residual, for more information on the counterparts, see
Brunken and Westley (2002).26 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
relative to nominal GDP.  The lending slowdown has occurred
across all sectors:  households, private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs) and non-bank — or other — financial
corporations (OFCs) (Chart 5).
The unusually sharp slowdown in bank lending during this
episode is likely to in part reflect the role of the financial crisis
in instigating and propagating the recession.  As the financial
crisis intensified, credit supply was tightened as the banking
sector increasingly sought to restrain balance sheet growth
and improve the quality and profitability of new lending.  That
reflected a number of factors, including an increase in banking
sector funding costs relative to Bank Rate and a reduction in
banks’ risk appetite.  This shock to credit supply appears to
account for a large part of the slowdown in annual real bank
lending growth since the recession began.(1)
Not all of the slowdown in bank lending might be attributable
to a credit supply shock.  Demand factors may also have had a
role.  Weak activity and investment as a result of the recession
are likely to have lowered the demand for new loans, despite
the extraordinary monetary stimulus imparted by the MPC in
response to the recession.  However, it is difficult to assess the
The counterparts framework for analysis of
changes in broad money
In order to understand movements in broad money supply, it is
useful to view them in the context of the balance sheet of the
UK banking sector, specifically by examining changes in the
counterparts to broad money.(1)
Broad money is one major component of the liabilities side
of banks’ balance sheets.  It accounts for about 23% of the
UK banking sector’s total financial liabilities (Chart A).
Alongside broad money, a further 24% of total liabilities are
denominated in sterling.  That comprises sterling deposits
from intermediate other financial corporations (IOFCs),
non-residents and the public sector and also non-deposit
liabilities, such as long-term debt and equity.
On the other side of the balance sheet, the sterling financial
assets of the UK banking sector mainly comprise loans to the
non-bank private sector (M4L) and, to a lesser extent, loans to
IOFCs, non-residents and the public sector.  Sterling assets
also include a small contribution from banks’ holdings of other
financial assets.
The remainder of the banking sector balance sheet is
denominated in foreign currency and may typically be less
relevant for explaining movements in broad money.  The gross
foreign currency assets and liabilities of the banking sector are
large, reflecting the international operations of the largest
UK banks.  But banks appear to avoid large fluctuations in their
net currency exposures over time.  And it is that net position
that is relevant in accounting for movements in M4.
Using this stylised balance sheet, changes in broad money can
be mechanically accounted for by changes in the other
components of the banking sector’s balance sheet:
ΔBroad money (M4) ≡ ΔLending to non-bank private sector 
(M4L) + ΔNet £ lending to IOFCs + 
ΔNet £ lending to non-residents + ΔNet
£ lending to public sector + ΔNet other 
£ assets + ΔNet FC assets.
This counterparts framework can be used to decompose the
flow into broad money over any given time period.  It can
therefore provide an insight into the factors affecting broad
money supply since the onset of recession.
Assets Liabilities
Lending (M4L)
Foreign currency (FC) assets
Other £ assets
£ lending to the public sector
  (plus coin) 
£ loans to non-residents
£ loans to IOFCs
Foreign currency (FC) liabilities
Other £ liabilities
£ deposits of the public sector 
Broad money (M4)
£ deposits of IOFCs
£ deposits of non-residents
Chart A A stylised balance sheet for the UK banking
sector(a)(b)(c)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) Bars are scaled to reflect the relative sizes of each component.
(b) UK banking sector includes the central bank.
(c) Lending (M4L) and broad money (M4) both exclude holdings of IOFCs.
(1) For a detailed discussion of the balance sheet counterparts to broad money, see
Brunken and Westley (2002).
(1) See Bell and Young (2010).Research and analysis The recent weakness in broad money growth 27
extent to which these factors weighing on credit demand
would have occurred independently of tighter credit supply
conditions.(1)
Substitution towards alternative forms of finance provides one
indication of tightness in the supply of bank credit.  A
worsening of the cost and availability of new bank loans makes
capital market finance relatively more attractive.  For instance,
large PNFCs, with access to a variety of forms of finance, have
substituted towards both bond and equity capital market
finance since the onset of the recession (Chart 6).  This
disintermediation from the banking sector also occurred in the
previous recession.  But the scale and speed of substitution in
this recession was somewhat greater.  That may in part reflect
a larger shock to the supply of banking sector credit following
the recent financial crisis.  But it might also reflect the impact
of the MPC’s programme of asset purchases on the relative
cost of capital market finance and the demand for credit.  This
issue will be explored in more detail in the final section of this
article.
Overall, the marked slowdown in aggregate lending appears
consistent with the effects of a credit supply shock associated
with the financial crisis and the effects of the ensuing
recession.  The weakness in credit creation was a key factor
driving the recent weakness in broad money growth.
II  Banking sector stabilisation
A second key factor that pushed down on money growth
since the start of the recession was the net effect of the
banking system’s attempt to repair the capital, funding and
liquidity position of its balance sheet in the wake of the
financial crisis. 
In the third quarter of 2007 the global financial crisis began to
affect the United Kingdom as conditions in financial markets,
and bank funding markets in particular, deteriorated.  As this
intensified, and the global economic downturn gathered pace,
realised and prospective losses for the UK banking sector
increased sharply.  These losses eroded capital levels in the
banking sector, prompting major banks to rebuild capital levels
by issuing additional equity (via rights issues) and also
long-term non-equity capital instruments.  The banking sector
also sought to retain profits (rather than paying them out in
dividends or staff compensation), in part to build provisions,
but also to rebuild capital.(2) The financial crisis also
highlighted the reliance of the United Kingdom and global
banking sectors on wholesale funding markets, and the
subsequent vulnerability of major institutions to a change of
sentiment in (particularly short-term) markets.  As a result,
lenders focused on increasing the duration of their liabilities by
issuing long-term debt instruments.
Large-scale accumulation of these sterling non-deposit
liabilities(3) acted to bear down on money growth since the
onset of the recession.  Issuance of equity or long-term debt
would have pushed down on money growth to the extent that
the new instruments were purchased by the non-bank private
sector, using sterling deposits.  UK asset managers, such as
insurance companies and pension funds, were significant
purchasers of the increased issuance associated with the
stabilisation of the banking sector.  This issuance therefore
acted as a negative shock to the supply of broad money.  At
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Chart 5 Sectoral credit flows(a)(b)
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as in Chart 1.
(b) Both total lending (M4L) and lending to OFCs exclude transactions with intermediate OFCs
where available.  All series are adjusted to exclude the effects of securitisation.
(1) For a thorough discussion of both the supply and demand factors underlying the
recent slowdown in bank lending, see Bell and Young (2010).
(2) For detail on the capital raising undertaken by UK — and global — banks, see Bank of
England (2008), page 32.
(3) Not all sterling liabilities of the banking sector are included in the United Kingdom’s
measure of broad money.  Specifically, liabilities designed to absorb losses in the
event of financial distress at a bank (ie equity and long-term non-equity capital
instruments, so-called ‘hybrids’) and long-term bonds (with an original maturity
greater than five years) are excluded, as these are not used to carry out transactions
and are not considered close substitutes for less risky and more liquid deposits.  These
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Chart 6 PNFCs’ substitution of bank debt to capital
market issuance(a)(b)(c)
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as in Chart 1.
(b) The loans series shows sterling net lending to PNFCs excluding the effects of securitisation.
(c) The capital issuance series shows the net amount raised from sterling issuance of equity,
bonds and commercial paper by UK PNFCs.28 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
of pre-provision profits would also have dampened money
growth, relative to a counterfactual where these profits would
have been paid out as deposits to shareholders and employees
in the UK non-bank private sector. 
The total impact of the banking sector’s accumulation of
non-deposit liabilities on broad money is uncertain, but likely
to be large.  Data on the net issuance of sterling equity and
long-term debt and private data collected by the Bank’s
statistical area on the retention of profits suggest that a
reasonable estimate for the total drain on broad money from
these factors was around £240 billion since the recession
began.  This estimate is uncertain — the figure could be larger
or smaller for several reasons.  For example, the figure could be
larger if new issues of sterling long-term debt were not issued
in public markets and so not captured in the data (so-called
private placements).  Or the figure could be smaller if not all
the sterling equity and long-term debt was purchased by the
UK non-bank private sector.
Increased regulatory pressure on banks to hold more liquid
assets may have partially offset the drain on money induced
by other aspects of banking sector stabilisation.  Banks
responded to stricter liquidity regulation by increasing their
holdings of government bonds by about £80 billion since the
start of the recession.  If these were purchased from the
non-bank private sector, this would have provided an
offsetting boost to the money supply.(1)
The overall net impact of banking sector stabilisation is
likely to have been a drain on money holdings, representing
an estimated negative money supply shock of around
£160 biIIion (Chart 7).
III  MPC asset purchases (quantitative easing)
As the recession intensified during 2008, the MPC reduced
Bank Rate sharply.  By March 2009 the MPC cut Bank Rate to
just 0.5% — the lowest level in the 300-year history of the
Bank of England.  Despite that, the MPC judged that further
stimulus would be needed for the medium-term inflation
outlook to be consistent with the 2% target.  The MPC decided
that the best way to loosen monetary policy further was to
undertake a programme of asset purchases, in order to
increase nominal demand and so inflation.  The initial
announcement was for asset purchases of £75 billion, but
between March and November 2009 — in the face of a
consistently weak outlook for medium-term inflation — the
MPC increased the programme of asset purchases to
£200 billion.(2)
The Bank of England purchased UK government bonds (gilts),
and a small amount of corporate bonds and commercial paper.
The aim was to purchase these assets largely from UK
non-bank financial corporations, such as asset managers, with
purchases settled via the banking system.  Asset purchases
would therefore increase broad money.
It cannot be certain that all assets were purchased from
UK non-bank financial corporations:  the banking sector or
non-resident sector may have sold some of their gilt holdings
to the Bank of England.  In this case, the money balances of the
non-bank private sector would not have risen, so the increase
in money holdings may have been less than the programme of
asset purchases.
But the leakage of asset purchases outside of the non-bank
private sector is likely to have been limited.  First, the banking
sector held relatively few gilts at the start of the asset
purchase programme.(3) Second, both the banking sector and
non-resident sector actually increased their holdings of gilts
during the period over which asset purchases took place
(Chart 8).  Indeed, over the period since the recession began,
the proportion of total gilt issuance purchased by the banking
sector and non-resident sector has been broadly in line with
the proportions purchased between 1991 and 1993, when the
fiscal deficit last rose sharply following a recession.  In
contrast, the non-bank private sector has barely increased its
holdings of gilts when in the 1991–93 period it took up over
half the gilts issued.  It therefore seems unlikely that a
significant proportion of asset purchases were purchased from
outside of the non-bank private sector — so the impact on
broad money was likely to have been close to £200 billion.
(1) Similarly, if these government bonds were bought directly from the Debt
Management Office, that would have also boosted the money supply given that those
government bonds would otherwise have been purchased by the non-bank private
sector.
(2) The purchases were completed in January 2010.
(3) The UK banking sector’s net holdings of UK government bonds at the end of 2008,
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Chart 7 Estimated net impact of banking sector
stabilisation on broad money(a)(b)
(a) ‘Banking sector net accumulation of non-deposit liabilities’ comprises net issuance of
sterling equity and long-term senior secured (residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS)
or covered bonds) or unsecured debt greater than five years in maturity at issue and
pre-provision retained profits.
(b) ‘Banking sector net purchases of gilts’ excludes purchases of gilts by the Bank of England.Research and analysis The recent weakness in broad money growth 29
Summarising the impact of the economic factors
The three economic factors outlined above can broadly
account for the weakness in broad money since the onset of
the recent recession.  They can also largely explain the
movements in the principal counterparts to broad money over
that period.  The actual increase in broad money between
2008 Q2 and 2010 Q4 was £99 billion.  Table A shows a
mechanical decomposition of this money growth into its
accounting counterparts.  It also shows the quantitative
estimates of the impact on money of each of the three
economic factors and indicates which money counterpart they
affected:
(a) Weakness in lending was associated with a weak inflow
into money of £55 billion.  That estimate is simply set
equal to the amount of lending actually observed,
reflecting the conclusion that the financial crisis and credit
supply shock can broadly account for much of the observed
weakness in lending.
(b) Banking sector stabilisation is estimated to have
contributed to a net drain of money of around £160 billion.
That consisted of about a £240 billion reduction in money
holdings estimated from data on banking sector issuance of
long-term debt and equity and retention of profits, in part
offset by about £80 billion of gilt purchases by the banking
sector over the period.
(c) Asset purchases contributed to a net boost of money of
£200 billion, assuming that the assets were purchased
from the non-bank private sector.
Despite the ability to explain broad money growth in terms of
just three key economic developments, there is significant
uncertainty associated with each estimate.  They should
therefore be taken as indicative guides.  For instance, it is
impossible to estimate precisely the extent of the leakage of
asset purchases to non-residents and the extent to which
issuance associated with banking sector stabilisation was
purchased by the non-bank private sector.
Money, nominal spending and the velocity of
circulation
As noted in the introduction, understanding recent
movements in the velocity of circulation is important for
gauging the signal contained in weak broad money growth
about future nominal spending.  This section analyses the
extent to which weaker broad money has been associated with
lower nominal spending and how much has been absorbed in
the velocity of circulation.
Understanding the recent velocity profile
It is possible to compare the recent behaviour of broad money
velocity with that in the early 1990s, normalised on the
quarter before the start of the recession for each period.  The
early 1990s period provides a useful counterfactual
comparison as it represented a period of recession that
followed a large expansion of the financial sector.  In the 1990s
recession, money growth fell rapidly and converged on the rate
of nominal GDP growth, after which the two series continued
to grow broadly in line for several years — the profile of
velocity was thus fairly flat (Chart 9).
In the first few quarters of the recent recession, the behaviour
of velocity was quite similar to the 1990s recession.  But
thereafter velocity followed a ‘V’-shaped pattern.  First
velocity fell, which reflected a sharp fall in nominal spending in
the first half of 2009, while money growth, although weak,
remained slightly positive.  Subsequently, velocity recovered,

















Chart 8 Change in gilt holdings by sector since the
recession began(a)
(a) Gilts acquired through asset purchases are held by the Asset Purchase Facility, a subsidiary of
the Bank of England.
Table A Accounting for broad money growth since the onset of
the recent recession(a)(b)(c)
£ billions
Estimated impact of economic factors
Weakness in Banking sector  Asset 
lending stabilisation purchases Total
£ lending to the private
sector (M4L) 55 55 55
– net £ non-deposit
liabilities 243 240 240
+ net £ lending to the
public sector 262 80 200 280
+ changes in other
counterparts 26
Change in broad money 99 55 -160 200 95
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) The period covers 2008 Q2 to 2010 Q4.
(b) The first column (unshaded) shows the accounting counterparts to money identified in Chart 4.
(c) Each of the columns shaded blue show the estimated impact on broad money of one of the economic
factors discussed in the text.  The total impact of a given factor is shown in the bottom row and the other
rows show which accounting counterparts were likely affected by that economic factor.
Counterparts to broad   
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continued weak money growth.  During 2010 velocity returned
to a similar level relative to the peak of the cycle as in the
previous recession.
What might explain the V-shaped pattern of velocity?  One
potential explanation is the impact of asset purchases.  As
discussed earlier, a key component of the transmission
mechanism of asset purchases is the portfolio rebalancing
channel, based on the assumption that gilts and deposits are
imperfect substitutes.  Asset purchases initially required lower
yields and higher asset prices in order for portfolio managers
to be willing to hold the additional deposits created.  In time,
higher asset prices fed through into higher spending by
households and companies.  Nominal spending was therefore
affected with a lag.  So, other things equal, asset purchases
should have led to an initial fall in velocity during the portfolio
rebalancing phase, followed by a subsequent rise as nominal
spending increased.
There are two caveats to this explanation of the recent
V-shape in velocity.  First, asset purchases cannot explain the
large fall in velocity observed in 2009 Q1, as they did not begin
in earnest until 2009 Q2.  Second, banking sector stabilisation
may have partially offset the impact of asset purchases on
velocity.  As discussed in the previous section, banking sector
stabilisation is likely to have reduced money holdings
significantly.  If bank shares are considered imperfect
substitutes for bank deposits, that may also have had a lagged
effect on nominal spending via portfolio rebalancing channels.
So the additional and opposing impact from banking sector
stabilisation may have partially dampened the impact of asset
purchases on velocity.
To gauge the behaviour of ‘underlying’ velocity over the period,
a crude attempt can be made to strip out the net impact on
the money supply from the combined effects of banking sector
stabilisation and asset purchases.  Since the onset of the
recession, banking sector stabilisation has acted to drain
money.  But since mid-2009, asset purchases more than offset
that effect, such that the net shock to the level of money
supply is estimated to have turned positive (Chart 10).  This
net money supply shock can be mechanically removed from
the money stock and, making the assumption that the level of
nominal spending is unaffected, an alternative ‘underlying’
path for velocity can be constructed (Chart 11).  There are two
features to note from the underlying profile that results.
First, a V-shape in velocity remains, but shows a somewhat
sharper fall and subsequent recovery.  So the trough in velocity
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Chart 9 Velocity compared to the 1990s recession(a)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) Broad money velocity scaled to 100 in the quarter before the start of recession — that is
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Chart 10 Estimated net impact of banking sector
stabilisation and asset purchases on broad money(a)(b)
(a) ‘Banking sector net accumulation of non-deposit liabilities’ as defined in Chart 7.
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Chart 11 Velocity compared to the 1990s recession —
stripping out the estimated net money supply shock(a)(b)(c)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) Broad money velocity scaled to 100 in the quarter before the start of recession — that is
1990 Q2 and 2008 Q1 respectively.
(b) The green line shows the net money supply shock relating to banking sector stabilisation and
asset purchases, as set out in Chart 10, translated into velocity space.
(c) The dashed blue line shows the underlying velocity profile when the impact of the net money
supply shock is subtracted from the observed velocity profile.Research and analysis The recent weakness in broad money growth 31
timing effect, exacerbated by the speed of the downturn.  In
the second half of 2008, nominal spending began to fall and
then fell very sharply in early 2009 — a much sharper decline
than seen in the 1990s recession.  Given the costs to
households and companies of adjusting credit and money
holdings, this may have entailed a period when underlying
money (after allowing for the effects of asset purchases and
banking sector stabilisation), was still adjusting to lower
spending in the economy.  And given the economic uncertainty
at the time, households and companies may have been
content to hold a buffer of liquidity, especially if they were
anticipating difficulties in obtaining credit in the future.  As a
result, the recovery in nominal spending in the second half of
2009 could be financed by drawing down those buffers,
without households and companies demanding additional
money.
The second feature to note is that the underlying profile of
velocity has been fairly flat over the past year, especially if a
lagged impact on nominal spending from the net money
supply shock is also factored in.  Over the past year, the fact
that underlying velocity appears to have been broadly flat, at a
level close to that implied by the previous recession, indicates
that there has been no significant shift in the demand for
money relative to spending.  This may tell us something about
the trend in velocity looking ahead, which will be important in
analysing the implications of future broad money outturns for
monetary policy.
Prospects for velocity
Since the start of the 1980s broad money velocity has trended
downwards, reflecting the growing importance of financial
intermediation in the economy.  That trend might be expected
to reassert itself at some point.  But the experience of the
1990s would suggest that the trend can be interrupted for an
extended period, if the forces pushing up on velocity are
persistent enough.  Much depends on how the banking sector
evolves and how that affects relative rates of return on
borrowing and holding deposits.  It is useful to distinguish
between two types of relative rates of return.  First, rates of
return that lead to changes in money and credit for a given
path for nominal spending — that is those that change the
degree of financial intermediation undertaken by the banking
sector.  Second, rates of return that change the amount of
nominal spending for a given path of money, reflecting shifts
between the transactions and portfolio demands for money.
The former depends on the cost of bank intermediation (the
loan-deposit rate spread);  the latter depends on the rate of
return on deposits relative to other financial and tangible
assets.
The evidence on the likely future cost of banking system
intermediation is mixed.  For PNFCs, significant
disintermediation was observed in 2009, facilitated by
issuance on the capital markets (Chart 6).  But the amount of
debt-equity substitution decreased in 2010, suggesting
reduced incentives to disintermediate.  For households, both
loan and deposit rates have generally fallen by less than
Bank Rate since the recession began.(1) But the spread
between the average rate on the stocks of loans and deposits
has not changed dramatically (Chart 12).  For the average
household, the cost of maintaining existing intermediation
may therefore have changed relatively little over the course of
the recession.
In contrast, there has been a significant increase in the
marginal cost of intermediation for households — the rate on
new lending relative to the rate of return on new deposits
(Chart 12).  That would give an incentive for households to
intermediate less via the banking system in the future —
namely to pay down a proportion of maturing loans with
deposits, rather than to refinance.  There are signs though
that this incentive may also have diminished somewhat over
the past year.
The significance of disintermediation in the future will depend
on how persistent the high marginal cost of intermediation
proves to be.  That in turn will depend on conditions in the
banking sector and how loan and deposit rates respond to
future changes in monetary policy.  For example, the banking
sector may seek to close the gap between the stock of loans
and deposits, built up in the decade preceding the recession
(Chart 3).  In particular, banks may seek to replace maturing
debt liabilities with retail deposits.  That would likely require
them to bid up deposit rates relative to other rates of return,
















Chart 12 Average and marginal cost of intermediation
for households(a)(b)(c)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) Cost of intermediation based on the loan rate to deposit rate spread.  Loan rates are based on
the weighted average interest rate on mortgages and personal loans.  Deposit rates are based
on the weighted average time deposit rate. 
(b) Average cost of intermediation calculated from the effective rate on the outstanding stock of
loans and deposits.
(c) Marginal cost of intermediation calculated from the effective new business rate on loans and
deposits.
(1) See Button et al (2010).32 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
The likelihood of further disintermediation will also depend on
the distribution of existing deposits and loans and on how
many households and companies face refinancing their loans
at high marginal borrowing rates.  The extent that
disintermediation will increase velocity relative to its
downward historical trend is therefore hard to judge.
The outlook for velocity would also be affected if nominal
spending were to change for a given amount of money
holdings.  There may be factors that provide an incentive for
households and companies to mobilise existing savings
deposits to finance more nominal spending — a process
sometimes known as ‘dishoarding’.  The key factor determining
the incentive to dishoard is the rate of return on deposits
relative to other assets.  If deposit rates are low relative to the
return on financial assets (or the marginal utility derived from
tangible assets such as consumer durables, housing and
investment goods), there is an incentive for households and
companies to try to run down their money holdings and
substitute into these other assets.  But money holdings cannot
be reduced in aggregate unless some households or companies
choose to repay bank debt.  So, for a given level of
intermediation, dishoarding would lead to money being passed
around the economy between households and companies until
asset prices and nominal spending rise (and asset yields fall)
sufficiently to offset the initial incentive to reduce money.  In
this scenario, previously idle money balances become active
and there is a shift between the portfolio and transactions
demands for money.  That would allow for greater money
spending for a given level of aggregate deposits, pushing up on
velocity relative to its downward historical trend.
Simple measures of the relative rate of return on deposits do
appear to be historically low.  That suggests an incentive to
switch out of deposits (Chart 13).  First, household time
deposit rates are currently well below simple measures of the
return on holding shares (the dividend yield).  That is
consistent with strong flows into retail unit trusts recently.
Second, the nominal deposit rate has fallen significantly below
measures of the rate of inflation expected by households.
Other things equal, this fall in real deposit rates suggests a fall
in the rate of return on holding money relative to holding real
assets such as consumer durables and housing.
These simple measures do not, however, capture the total rate
of return on holding alternative assets to deposits.  In
particular, expected capital gains on financial assets and
expected changes in the relative price of tangible assets over
the relevant investment period are also important.  The
relative riskiness of holding alternative assets compared to
holding a bank deposit should also be considered.  These
expectations and perceptions of risk are very difficult to
measure.  To the extent that expected capital gains on assets
such as equities and housing have also fallen over the recent
period, or if the perceived riskiness of holding them has
increased, that would mean the incentives to dishoard are less
than the simple measures suggest. 
The actual path of velocity may deviate from the underlying
path of velocity because of the impact of money supply
shocks.  For instance, the banking sector may continue to
recapitalise at the expense of deposits.(1) Observed velocity
may also increase relative to trend if lagged effects on nominal
spending from past money supply shocks continue to come
through.  The final section looks at what the recent money
data might have told us about the impact of these money
supply shocks on asset prices and nominal spending in the
economy.
Has the recent behaviour of money revealed
anything about the transmission mechanism?
The analysis in the second section suggested that three factors
can broadly account for the behaviour of broad money since
the outset of the recession — asset purchases, weak credit
creation and the stabilisation of the banking sector.  So far,
these have been treated as independent shocks.  But weaker
credit growth and stronger bank issuance may both have been
partly influenced by asset purchases.(2)
For instance, both companies and banks may have been able
to issue more equity and long-term debt than otherwise as a
result of the higher asset prices and lower yields induced by
asset purchases.  Companies and banks may have used this
issuance to lower their bank debt and deposit liabilities
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Chart 13 Relative return on household deposits(a)(b)
Sources:  Bank of England, Barclays Capital, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Deposit rate minus expected inflation is defined as the quoted rate on one to two-year
fixed-rate bonds minus one year ahead household inflation expectations from the Barclays
Basix survey. 
(b) Deposit rate minus dividend yield is defined as quoted time (30–90 day notice period)
deposit rate minus the quarterly average dividend yield on the FTSE All-Share index.
(1) In the longer term, a well-capitalised banking system with longer-term sources of
funding might be expected to foster a greater willingness to lend and hence boost
money growth further out.
(2) As discussed in Dale (2010), there are a number of ways through which asset
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initial money supply impact of asset purchases.  But both are
ultimately useful in strengthening the balance sheets of the
banking and corporate sectors, which may facilitate higher
investment and increased bank lending in the future.  
The extent to which increased issuance of debt and equity by
banks and companies was facilitated by asset purchases is
uncertain.  Issuance may have occurred in the absence of asset
purchases.  For instance, companies also substituted bank debt
for capital issuance in the previous recession, albeit to a
slightly lesser extent (Chart 6).  And it is likely that banks
would have had to issue more equity to improve their capital
position, even in the absence of asset purchases.
If asset purchases have helped to facilitate balance sheet repair
for the banking and corporate sectors, that would reduce the
initial impact of asset purchases on asset prices.  By allowing
greater issuance on the capital markets, the overall impact on
money from asset purchases would have been reduced.
Financial companies (such as asset managers) would have had
to absorb less money into their portfolios.  So a smaller asset
price effect would therefore have been required to
accommodate this smaller absorption of deposits.
Using empirical estimates of financial companies’ money
demand, it is possible to estimate the extent to which financial
yields and prices would have had to adjust to absorb a given
increase in their money holdings.  It is then possible to
estimate the implied increase in the money supply that would
be consistent with the asset price effect of asset purchases,
estimated in previous Bank of England work based on event
study and econometric analysis.(1)
A money supply increase of around £45 billion–£90 billion
would be consistent with the estimated asset price impact of
asset purchases derived from other studies (for more detail see
the box on page 34).  That is broadly consistent with the
increase in the money supply that occurred over the period of
asset purchases, when the effects of bank stabilisation and
PNFC capital market issuance over the same period are taken
into account.  Although uncertain, a money supply and
demand analysis would therefore provide some support for the
range of asset price increases attributed to asset purchases in
other studies.
Further evidence on the transmission mechanism of asset
purchases might be found by looking at sectoral money
holdings.  Asset purchases would suggest that there should
be an initial increase in the share of financial companies’
money holdings in broad money as asset managers sold assets
to the Bank of England.  But over time this share should have
declined as companies and households responded to higher
asset prices by increasing their spending, and obtaining the
money required to finance it by issuing shares to the financial
company sector or, in the case of households, liquidating
investments with them.
The pattern of sectoral money holdings in 2009 and 2010 has
been broadly consistent with the expected transmission of
asset purchases (Chart 14).  But careful interpretation of
changes in sectoral money holdings is needed.  Some of the
sectoral shifts in money may have been expected in the
absence of asset purchases.  For example, the financial
companies’ money share has in the past tended to decrease at
the expense of other sectors during recessions.  That might
have been due to the increase in the cyclical component of the
budget deficit that typically occurs in recessions.  Increased
benefit payments to households and concessions on company
taxation that were financed by increased government
borrowing from the financial sector would be expected to have
led to a rise in the share of non-financial companies’ and
households’ money holdings at the expense of asset managers.
That might explain part of the fall in the share of financial
companies’ money in 2010.
Conclusions
The recent weakness in broad money growth may be explained
by the weakness of bank lending arising from the recession and
the impact of banking sector stabilisation.  These two factors
have been offset by the positive impact of asset purchases on
broad money.  
The circumstantial evidence from the money data broadly
corroborates the estimates of the net impact of asset
purchases on asset prices from other empirical work.  Sectoral
evidence also suggests that asset purchases are broadly
working via the balance sheets of households and companies
to contribute to an increase in nominal spending.
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as in Chart 1.
(b) Shares based on four-quarter moving average of the break-adjusted stocks.
(c) Money shares calculated excluding the holdings of intermediate OFCs where available.
(1) For more information on the financial market impact of asset purchases, see 
Joyce et al (2010).
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Chart 14 Sectoral shares of the broad money stock(a)(b)(c)34 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
Cross-checking the impact of asset purchases
on asset prices
The impact of asset purchases on asset prices depends on
portfolio rebalancing by asset managers or ‘non-intermediate
OFCs’ such as insurance companies and pension funds.  It
assumes that these investors view bank deposits as an
imperfect substitute for other financial assets such as gilts and
equities.  Their demand for money will depend on the overall
value of their portfolio as well as the rate of return on deposits
relative to the yields on gilts and equities.  So institutional
investors require asset prices to rise and gilt and other financial
yields to fall in order to be willing to hold the additional
deposits created by asset purchases in their portfolios.  That
can be summarised according to the following relationship:
Percentage change in money demand
=
Percentage change in the value of financial company assets
+
θ* Percentage point change in (deposit rate – yield on other
assets)
where θ is a measure of how substitutable deposits are for
other assets — the semi-elasticity of money demand with
respect to the opportunity cost of holding a deposit.  How
much financial asset prices and yields need to change to
persuade institutional investors to hold more money depends
on θ.  If θ is zero then deposits and other assets are perfect
complements and money must be held in strict proportion to
the value of the overall portfolio.  So the percentage change in
asset prices must be equivalent to the percentage increase in
institutional investors’ money holdings implied by asset
purchases.  If θ is a very large number, deposits and other
assets are close substitutes and very little change in asset
prices and yields is required for these financial companies to
hold more money.  Using this relationship and an estimate of θ
from the data, the estimated impact of asset purchases on
asset prices (derived in other studies) can be cross-checked for
consistency with the money supply movements that can be
reasonably attributed to asset purchases.
The results of Joyce et al (2010) suggest that asset purchases
may have lowered gilt yields by around 1 percentage point
(and correspondingly increased gilt prices by approximately
10% assuming a ten-year average duration);  they also may
have had a potentially large, but highly uncertain, effect on
equity prices of between 20% and 70%.  That would suggest a
lower bound increase of around 10%–20% in financial
company asset values.  Empirical estimates of θfrom simple
models of financial institutions’ money holdings are in the
range of 5–10.  So a fall in yields of 100 basis points and an
increase in asset values of 10%–20% would be consistent with
financial companies willing to increase their deposit holdings
by 15%–30%.  Non-intermediate OFC money holdings were
approximately £300 billion during the period over which asset
purchases took place, so that would represent a willingness to
hold an additional £45 billion–£90 billion in deposits.
Table 1 below suggests that this range encompasses a lower
bound estimate of the increase in the money supply that could
reasonably be attributed to asset purchases, once the effects
of banking sector balance sheet restructuring and PNFC
disintermediation (bond, equity and commercial paper
issuance) are taken into account.  As suggested in the main
text, it is plausible that these additional factors may have
been related to the programme of asset purchases.  Table 1
shows an estimate of the money supply impact if all of the
impact of banking sector stabilisation and PNFC
disintermediation over the asset purchase period is assumed
to be related to asset purchases.  Assuming that less of the
impact of banking sector stabilisation and PNFC
disintermediation is attributable to asset purchases would
be consistent with a money supply impact approaching
£200 billion and an overall asset price increase approaching
the 70% upper bound estimate of Joyce et al (2010).
Overall, this suggests that the range of estimates of the asset
price impact of asset purchases from Joyce et al (2010) are
broadly consistent with the range of estimates arising from a
money supply and demand approach.
Table 1 Money supply impacts that could reasonably be
attributed to asset purchases(a)
£ billions
Direct effect of asset purchases +200
Banking sector stabilisation -90
PNFC bond, equity and commercial paper issuance -40
Lower bound estimate of money supply increase attributable
to asset purchases 70
(a) Note that, unlike Table A, the quantities here apply only to the period over which asset purchases were
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The experience of the 1990s suggests that velocity’s
long-run downward trend can be interrupted for
extended periods of time.  The recent conjuncture suggests
that there are economic factors pushing up on velocity
relative to its historical trend.  These are likely to persist in
the near term, suggesting that a given rate of growth in
nominal spending is likely to be associated with weaker
growth in broad money than was typically the case before
the crisis.  Developments in the banking sector and the relative
rates of return on money and credit will be important
determinants of whether and when the downward trend in
underlying velocity is restored.
Should money growth continue to remain weak, then
analysing the causes of this, using the types of analysis
employed in this article, will be important in judging whether
that weakness is signalling weak nominal spending growth in
the future.
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